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I. INTRODUCTION
"A dissent in a Court of last resort is an appeal . . . to the intelli-
gence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the
error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been
betrayed."' Should such an appeal prove successful, and a later compo-
sition of the court adopt the position advocated by the previous dis-
senter, the dissent takes on a second, reciprocal function by allowing
observers of the later court to trace the origins of a development in the
law. In the years since Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined the
Supreme Court, this concept has perhaps been no better illustrated than
in the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence. Beginning with its deci-
sions in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II)2 and Davis v.
FEC,3 and culminating with its most recent decision in Citizens United
* Senior Articles Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2011, University
of Miami School of Law; B.B.A. 2008, Florida International University. Thanks to Professor
Frances R. Hill for her invaluable guidance and feedback throughout the writing process. Thanks
also to everyone in my family for their support and encouragement.
1. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1936),
quoted in Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REv. 133, 144
(1990).
2. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
3. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
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v. FEC,4 the Court has effectively channeled the dissents of its current
and former members in creating a new majority position that is centered
on a robust protection of free speech rights.
Campaign finance regulations implicate both the First Amendment6
and Congress's power to "make or alter" regulations for the governance
of federal elections.7 In the arena of campaign finance, the Court has
split into two readily identifiable factions,' each of which have implic-
itly adopted one of the above constitutional provisions as a baseline.'
Chief Justice Roberts articulated his baseline succinctly in WRTL II,
writing that "[tihese cases are about political speech."'o To Justice Sou-
ter, by contrast, the case was about "the integrity of democratic govern-
ment."' The purpose of this article is to examine the development of the
"political speech" baseline, in terms of its articulation in previous dis-
sents, of how the WRTL II and Citizens United majorities incorporated it
into those opinions, and of the implications for future First Amendment
challenges to campaign finance regulations.
Although challenges other than those based on the First Amend-
ment are sometimes brought,12 this article focuses on First Amendment
claims. Accordingly, the focus will be on regulations that limit indepen-
dent expenditures used to finance speech, as such regulations have long
been held to implicate free speech concerns more so than do regulations
that limit contributions, disclosures, etc." It is this speech-expenditure
relationship that was at issue in both WRTL II and Citizens United. In
4. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
5. See id. at 942 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing majority opinion as "essentially an
amalgamation of resuscitated dissents"). See also Frances R. Hill, Corporate Political Speech and
the Balance of Powers: A New Framework for Campaign Finance Jurisprudence in Wisconsin
Right to Life, 27 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 267 (2008) (characterizing the Court's decision in
WRTL II as the adoption of the previous dissenters' "political speech framework").
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .").
7. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1976) (identifying
the issue as whether Congress interfered with First Amendment freedoms in exercising its power
to regulate federal elections).
8. Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito on one side, and
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer on the other. Justice Sotomayor appears to have
joined the latter group.
9. See Hill, supra note 5, at 268-69 (characterizing the competing baselines as a "political
speech framework" and a "democratic integrity framework").
10. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 481 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
11. Id. at 536 (Souter, J., dissenting).
12. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134 (2003) (listing, inter alia, federalism and
equal protection challenges), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
13. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21, 23 (1976) (per curiam) (explaining that
limitations on expenditures impose "significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms
of political expression" than do limits on contributions because, inter alia, the latter type of
limitation does not "infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues").
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each case, the claimants brought a First Amendment challenge to the
validity of section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), which prohibited corporations from spending general treasury
funds to finance "electioneering communications."" Thus, the bulk of
the analysis will focus on that provision, with other provisions to be
introduced as necessary.
Part II of this article serves to provide a brief background of BCRA
and of section 203. It also includes a brief discussion of the Court's
decisions in WRTL II and in Davis. Part III discusses the Court's opinion
in Citizens United. Part IV is devoted to a discussion of why the First
Amendment was implicated by the electioneering-communications pro-
vision of BCRA. Part V, which analyzes how the Court incorporated
previous dissents into its holdings, is split into several subparts, each
devoted to a discussion of a particular asserted state interest. The pur-
pose of organizing the analysis in this way is to identify how the new
majority position views these interests, which may result in the identifi-
cation of at least a somewhat uniform approach to adjudicating First
Amendment challenges to campaign finance laws. Thus, Part V-A dis-
cusses the interest in combating the "corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth"; Part V-B discusses the interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance thereof;" Part V-C discusses
the interest in protecting shareholders from having their money spent "to
support political candidates to whom they may be opposed";'" and Part
V-D discusses the interest in "leveling the playing field" by equalizing
resources." Part VI concludes.
14. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(b)(2), (c)(1)-(5) (2006)), invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC,
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
15. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
16. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143 (asserting such an interest as justification for
contribution limits); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428 (2000)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting FEC v. Nat'1 Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 496-97 (1985)) ("[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only
legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign
finances.").
17. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003) (quoting FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work
Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)).
18. See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2774 (2008).
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II. SETTING THE STATE: BCRA, ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS,
AND THE BEGINNING OF A TREND
A. Background of BCRA
BCRA" represents the latest in a line of campaign finance reforms
dating to the Tillman Act of 1907.20 The provisions of BCRA were
enacted as amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA). 21 The "central provisions" of BCRA were "designed to address
Congress' concerns about the increasing use of soft money22 and issue
advertising to influence federal elections."2 3 In McConnell v. FEC, the
Court upheld numerous provisions of BCRA, including section 203,
against facial challenges. 24 However, the Court in Citizens United has
now overruled the part of McConnell that upheld section 203.25
Section 203 of BCRA prohibited corporations from financing
"electioneering communications" with general treasury funds. 26 An
"electioneering communication" is defined as "any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication which refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office"; is made within sixty days before a general election, or
thirty days before a primary election, for the office sought by the candi-
date; and "in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate
for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the
relevant electorate."27 In the case of a presidential or vice presidential
candidate, the "targeting" criterion is met when the communication can
19. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
20. Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864-65 (1907). The Tillman Act has been
referred to as "the first federal campaign finance law." Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 152 (quoting
ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAW xvii (1988)).
21. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
22. "Soft money" refers to funds that are not subject to FECA's disclosure requirements and
source and amount limitations. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122-23 (2003). Citizens
United involved only independent expenditures and thus left untouched BCRA's limitations on
contributions to political parties, also known as soft-money bans. See RNC v. FEC, 698 F. Supp.
2d 150, 153 (D.D.C. 2010), aff'd, 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010). The court in RNC relied on McConnell
in holding that large soft-money contributions could be prohibited even if used to fund issue
advertisements. Id. at 157. The effect of the Supreme Court's affirmance is that "outside groups,"
including corporations, have an advantage over political parties in that only the former "may
receive unlimited donations both to advocate in favor of federal candidates and to sponsor issue
ads." Id. at 160 n.5.
23. Id. at 132.
24. Id. at 209.
25. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
26. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(b)(2), (c)(1)-(5) (2006)).
27. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 81,
89 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (2006)).
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be received by at least 50,000 people in the United States (starting from
thirty days before the national nominating convention), or by at least
50,000 people in a state in which a primary election is being held within
thirty days.28
While corporations were prohibited from funding electioneering
communications with general treasury funds, they could do so via segre-
gated funds known as political action committees (PACs). 29 However,
corporations generally may not solicit contributions to their PACs from
anyone other than their stockholders, executive and administrative per-
sonnel, and their families.30 Certain nonprofit corporations were exempt
from the "electioneering communications" provisions." Among other
characteristics, such corporations had to be organized solely for the pro-
motion of political ideas, could not engage in political activities, and
could not accept donations from for-profit corporations.32
B. WRTL I and Davis
Although the Court in McConnell held that section 203 was not
invalid on its face, the Court in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC
(WRTL I) clarified that as-applied challenges were still available.3 3 In
WRTL II, the Court entertained such a challenge. Wisconsin Right to
Life (WRTL) was a "nonprofit, nonstock, ideological advocacy corpora-
tion" with tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code. 34 WRTL had aired radio advertisements that urged listeners
to contact Senators Feingold and Kohl and to tell them to oppose a judi-
cial filibuster.35 As the ads were paid for with funds from its general
treasury, and would thus become subject to the restriction on election-
eering communications thirty days before the Wisconsin primary,
WRTL sought an injunction and brought a First Amendment
challenge.3 6
Although the challenge was successful, no clear majority position
emerged. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, established at
28. 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(b)(3)(ii) (2009).
29. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204; 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (2006).
30. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i) (2006).
31. See 11. C.F.R. § 114.10(d)(2) (2009).
32. 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(c) (2009).
33. 546 U.S. 410, 412 (2006) (per curiam).
34. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 458 (2007).
35. Id. at 458-59 (citing Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 2d
195, 198 n.3 (D.D.C. 2006) (three-judge court), aff d, 551 U.S. 449 (2007)). The relevant portion
of the advertisement informed listeners that a "group of Senators" was blocking judicial nominees,
and that listeners should "[Clontact Senators Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose the
filibuster."
36. Id. at 460.
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the outset that section 203 burdened speech and was therefore subject to
strict scrutiny." After noting that BCRA survived strict scrutiny "to the
extent it regulates express advocacy or its functional equivalent," 3 8
Chief Justice Roberts rejected a test for "functional equivalence" that
would depend on whether the advertisements were intended to influence
voters' decisions (and on whether they had such an effect)." Instead, the
following test was devised: "[A] court should find that an ad is the func-
tional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a
specific candidate."4 0 Applying this test, the ads were held to be some-
thing less than the functional equivalent of express advocacy.4 ' The fol-
lowing characteristics were said to suggest issue, as distinct from
express, advocacy: The ads (1) urged the adoption of a particular posi-
tion on an issue; (2) did not mention an election, candidate, or party; and
(3) "[did] not take a position on a candidate's character, qualifications,
or fitness for office."42
Justice Scalia, writing for Justices Kennedy and Thomas, went fur-
ther. In rejecting both an "intent and effects" test and Chief Justice Rob-
erts' "no reasonable interpretation" test as "impermissibly vague,
those three Justices served notice that their view of the First Amendment
would allow little room for the regulation of issue advocacy. Indeed,
Justice Scalia's opinion suggested that there would be three votes for
overruling that part of McConnell which upheld section 203 on its face,
noting that "any clear rule that would protect all genuine issue ads would
cover such a substantial number of ads prohibited by § 203 that § 203
37. Id. at 464 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
38. Id. at 465 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003)).
39. Id. at 468-69; see also FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987) (in defining
express advocacy, "[tihe subjective intent of the speaker cannot alone be determinative.").
40. Id. at 469-70. The Ninth Circuit in Furgatch had held that "speech need not include any
of the words listed in Buckley to be express advocacy under the [Federal Election Campaign] Act,
but it must, when read as a whole, and with limited reference to external events, be susceptible of
no other reasonable interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate."
Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 864. The court found that "express" advocacy presents an "unmistakable"
message, presents a "clear plea for action," and makes "clear what action is advocated." Id.
Buckley's "magic words" test had provided that express advocacy contained words such as "vote
for," "elect," "support," etc. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976). The Court later
clarified that express advocacy could be found in communications that were "marginally less
direct than "Vote for Smith.'" FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986). For
a criticism of the "magic words" test for express advocacy, see Scott E. Thomas & Jeffrey H.
Bowman, Is Soft Money Here To Stay Under the "Magic Words" Doctrine?, 10 STA. L. & PO.'Y
REv. 33 (1998).
41. Id. at 470.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 492 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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would be rendered substantially overbroad."" Noting that "the First
Amendment was not designed to facilitate legislation, even wise legisla-
tion,"4 5 Justice Scalia appeared to agree with Chief Justice Roberts on at
least this much: "Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes
to the speaker, not the censor."46
One year later, the Court had an opportunity to expand on the more
skeptical approach taken in WRTL II. In Davis v. FEC, the Court consid-
ered a challenge to BCRA section 319(a)." Section 319(a) provided,
inter alia, that when a candidate's expenditure of personal funds
exceeded a certain amount, the candidate's opponent would be allowed
to receive individual contributions at three times the usual limit.48 Thus,
rather than impose a limit on the amount of personal funds a candidate
could spend, the provision sought to "level the playing field" by raising
the contribution limit for one candidate without doing so for the other. In
that sense, it was neither a true expenditure limit nor a typical (i.e. uni-
form) contribution limit.
The Court first applied a form of intermediate scrutiny, explaining
that contribution limits must be "closely drawn" to serve a "sufficiently
important interest."4 9 The Court then characterized the asymmetrical
contribution limits as "an unprecedented penalty" on a candidate who
exercises the First Amendment right "to engage in the discussion of
public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own elec-
tion."o Accordingly, the Court re-characterized the asymmetrical contri-
bution limit as imposing a substantial burden on First Amendment
rights, thereby triggering strict scrutiny.5 ' Finally, the Court found no
compelling government interest, rejecting the interest in preventing cor-
ruption or the appearance of corruption as inapposite to a scheme that
would tend to discourage the use of personal funds, and rejecting the
purported interest in "leveling the playing field" as entirely illegiti-
mate.52 In both Davis and WRTL II, the new majority's analysis of the
various asserted state interests was informed by a skeptical, less deferen-
tial approach-one which had long before been articulated, and one
which would be cemented in its Citizens United decision.
44. Id. at 498.
45. Id. at 503.
46. Id. at 474 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
47. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
48. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 319(a), 116 Stat. 81,
109 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a- 1 (2006)), invalidated by Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
49. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2770 (2008) (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003)).
50. Id. at 2771 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52 (1976)).
51. Id. at 2772 (citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256 (1986)).
52. Id. at 2773.
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III. CITIZENS UNITED
Like WRTL, Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation exempt
from taxation under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)." In January 2008, it released
a film entitled Hillary: The Movie (hereinafter Hillary), a movie which
was said to be "quite critical" of then-Senator Clinton. Citizens United
sought to make the movie available through video-on-demand, and to
promote the film by airing advertisements on broadcast and cable televi-
sion. 5 Realizing that the film and the ads would likely be prohibited by
section 203's ban on electioneering communications should they be
aired within thirty days of the 2008 primary elections, Citizens United
sought declaratory and injunctive relief.56
Although the Court ultimately invalidated section 203 on its face,
the challenge was brought in as-applied form.5 Justice Kennedy, writing
for the Court, concluded that the case could not be resolved under any of
Citizens United's proposed narrow grounds "without chilling political
speech."" The Court first made short shrift of the argument that the film
was not "publicly distributed" (and therefore did not qualify as an elec-
tioneering communication) because a single video-on-demand transmis-
sion would be seen by only one household. Citing a regulation that
provided that "the number of people who can receive a cable transmis-
sion is determined by the number of cable subscribers in the relevant
area," the Court held that Hillary was an electioneering communication
on the ground that it could have been viewed by at least 50,000 people
(because the video-on-demand system "had 34.5 million subscribers
nationwide").6 0
53. Brief for Appellant at 5, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205).
54. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.
55. Id. The video-on-demand system "allows digital cable subscribers to select programming
from various menus" and enables viewers to "watch the program at any time" and to rewind or
pause the program.
56. Id. at 888.
57. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 53, at i (identifying the question presented as whether
section 203 could "constitutionally be applied to a feature-length documentary film about a
political candidate funded almost exclusively through noncorporate donations and made available
to digital cable subscribers through Video On Demand").
58. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 892.
59. Id. at 888-89.
60. Id. at 889 (citing 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.29(b)(7)(i)(G), 100.29(b)(3)(ii) (2009)). The American
Civil Liberties Union had argued in its amicus brief that whether a communication could be
received by at least 50,000 people required "a plausible likelihood that the communication will be
viewed by 50,000 or more potential voters." See Supplemental Brief of Former Officials of the
American Civil Liberties as Amici Curiae at 5, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205). The Court rejected such a standard and noted that an "inaccurate
estimate" of the number of people a communication is likely to reach would "potentially subject[ ]
the speaker to criminal sanctions." Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 772. As it did in much of its
opinion, the Court focused on the potential chill of free speech in noting that "[t]he First
[Vol. 65:293300
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The Court then addressed the argument that WRTL II mandated Hil-
lary's exclusion from the electioneering communications provision.
Under Chief Justice Roberts' controlling test in WRTL II,6 1 however, the
movie was deemed "equivalent to express advocacy" because it "con-
centrate[d] on alleged wrongdoing during the Clinton administration,
Senator Clinton's qualifications and fitness for office, and policies the
commentators predict she would pursue if elected President."6 2 The
Court found that the movie could not reasonably be interpreted as any-
thing other than an appeal to vote against then-Senator Clinton in the
presidential election.6 3 Thus, the movie and promotional advertisements
still would have fallen within section 203's restrictions.
Citizens United then argued that movies viewed through the video-
on-demand system had a "lower risk of distorting the political process
than do television ads."6 4 However, the Court "decline[d] to draw, and
then redraw, constitutional lines based on the particular media or tech-
nology used to disseminate political speech from a particular speaker."65
Given the rapid development of new technologies, the Court predicted
that a First Amendment standard that depended on analysis of such tech-
nologies would not only be flawed, but would result in protracted litiga-
tion that would itself impermissibly chill political speech.6 6
Finally, the Court rejected a proposed exception "for nonprofit cor-
porate political speech funded overwhelmingly by individuals."6
Although the Court had previously invalidated expenditure limitations
as applied to nonprofit corporations "that were formed for the sole pur-
pose of promoting political ideas, did not engage in business activities,
and did not accept contributions from for-profit corporations or labor
unions,"6 8 it declined to extend this holding to nonprofits that accepted
only a minimal amount of contributions from for-profit corporations. 9
Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney,
conduct demographic marketing research, or seek declaratory rulings before discussing the most
salient political issues of our day." Id.
61. "[A] court should find that [a communication] is the functional equivalent of express
advocacy only if [it] is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote
for or against a specific candidate." Id. at 889-90 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551
U.S. 449, 469-70 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.)) (alterations in original).
62. Id. at 890.
63. Id. This finding was amply supported, given that the movie's closing line stated as
follows: "Finally, before America decides on our next president, voters should need no reminders
of . . . what's at stake-the well being and prosperity of our nation."
64. Id.
65. Id. at 891.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1986)). See also 11
C.F.R. 114.10, which was based on the Court's holding in MCFL.
69. Id. at 891-92.
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The Court explained that doing so "would be to allow for-profit corpo-
rate general treasury funds to be spent for independent expenditures that
support candidates," thus requiring it to revisit its holding in Austin v.
Michigan State Chamber of Commercevo "that the Government can
restrict corporate independent expenditures for political speech.""
Having concluded that Austin was implicated by Citizens United's
challenge, and reasoning that the part of McConnell that upheld section
203 against facial challenge was based on Austin, the Court proceeded to
reconsider both holdings.7 2 The analysis began by characterizing the
prohibition on general-treasury expenditures as "a ban on corporate
speech," the corporation's ability to utilize a PAC for such speech being
discounted because a PAC "is a separate association from the corpora-
tion."7 This rejection of a PAC as a constitutionally sufficient alterna-
tive was pulled directly from Justice Kennedy's dissent in McConnell, in
which he argued that should a corporation take advantage of the PAC
option, the corporation "as a corporation" would still be prohibited from
speaking.74
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Citizens United then
detailed, albeit in dicta, some of the regulatory burdens of establishing
and administering a PAC." His dissent in McConnell proceeded in the
same manner, declining to characterize these reporting and administra-
tive requirements as merely "clerical," and instead arguing that they
"create major disincentives for speech, with the effect falling most heav-
70. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). Austin held that there was a compelling government interest in
preventing "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations for wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political ideas." Id. at 660.
71. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891-92.
72. Id. at 893-94. The issue of whether the Court should have entertained a facial challenge
was a source of considerable division within the Court. Justice Stevens devoted a significant
portion of his dissent to the issue, arguing that the case could have been decided on one of the
narrower grounds suggested by Citizens United and concluding that the issue of section 203's
facial validity was not properly before the Court. See id. at 931-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy likewise spent much of his majority opinion arguing that Austin (and by
extension, section 203's facial validity) had to be reconsidered, primarily because of the "chill" on
political speech that would result should corporations have to either seek advisory opinions from
the FEC or engage in protracted litigation before financing political speech from their general
treasuries. See id. at 888-96. Finally, Chief Justice Roberts devoted virtually all of his concurring
opinion to the issue, concluding that "[tihe First Amendment theory underlying Austin's holding is
extraordinarily broad," and that "the costs of giving [Austin] stare decisis effect are unusually
high" because Austin "is so difficult to confine to its facts." Id. at 922-23 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
73. Id. at 897.
74. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 330 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Austin,
494 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
75. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 253-54 (1986)).
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ily on smaller entities that often have the most difficulty bearing the
costs of compliance."7 6 In his McConnell dissent, Justice Kennedy gave
an example of what might happen to a corporation that had yet to set up
a PAC-it would not be able to engage in "spontaneous speech" that
identifies a candidate, even if its "vital interests are threatened" by pend-
ing legislation." This theme was repeated in his Citizens United major-
ity opinion, when he warned that the burdens of establishing and
administering a PAC might preclude a corporation from establishing it
"in time to make its views known regarding candidates and issues in a
current campaign."" And while Justice Scalia's opinion in WRTL II
cited Justice Kennedy's McConnell dissent for the proposition that the
PAC option was insufficient, Justice Kennedy's reiteration of the argu-
ment in his Citizens United opinion represents its unequivocal adoption
by a majority of the Court.
Whether the regulation at issue is viewed as a ban or a mere bur-
den, the Court explained that "[f]aws that burden political speech are
'subject to strict scrutiny,' which requires the Government to prove that
the restriction 'furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.' "7 The Court applied strict scrutiny even though
the speech could be seen as coming from corporations rather than from
natural persons, noting that restrictions on speech that distinguish
between speakers are prohibited by the First Amendment.s0 Having set
the framework for a traditional First Amendment analysis, the Court
took aim at Austin and its recognition of a compelling state interest in
preventing the "distorting effects" of wealth on elections. Before exam-
ining the Court's treatment of that now-discredited state interest, how-
ever, it is useful to assess the propriety of applying traditional First
Amendment analysis to the political speech of corporations.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
It is often argued that money is not speech,81 the implication being
76. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 332 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
79. Id. (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.)).
80. Id. (citing First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)). See Part IV,
infra, for a discussion of why the application of strict scrutiny was appropriate.
81. See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J.
1001, 1019 (1976) (arguing that "[m]oney . .. may be related to speech, but money itself is not
speech," and that "[c]ourts ought to judge restrictions on giving and spending accordingly."); see
also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398-99 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(arguing that "[m]oney is property; it is not speech.... [and it is therefore] not entitled to the
same protection as the right to say what one pleases").
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that a regulation of the money that is used to fund speech is not a regula-
tion of speech itself. As a matter of semantics, it is clear that money is
money and speech is speech. However, even a cursory review of the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence makes clear that strict scrutiny
is triggered when protected speech is significantly burdened-and it is
equally clear that speech can be burdened by financial restrictions.82
Two of the Court's First Amendment opinions, one of which was
authored by Justice Stevens and the other of which he joined, reveal that
the Court has long considered financial burdens on speech to be suffi-
cient to trigger strict scrutiny.
In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Board, the Court applied strict scrutiny to a statute that required
payment to the state of any proceeds due to a person, accused or con-
victed of a crime, for the production of a book or other work depicting
the crime.8 3 The Court began its analysis by noting that "[a] statute is
presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a
financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech."84
Putting aside the argument that campaign finance regulations are by def-
inition content-based (i.e., they apply specifically to campaign-related
speech), this is an example of the Court unambiguously treating a finan-
cial burden on speech as a regulation of speech itself, sufficient to trig-
ger strict scrutiny. Nowhere did the Court suggest that the income
produced by the speech was not speech itself-in other words, that
"money is not speech," and that the First Amendment was not impli-
cated. The key point is that although the speaker in Simon & Schuster
was not prevented from speaking as much as he wanted, the Court held
that the financial disincentive of forfeiting the income created by speech
was a sufficient burden to trigger strict scrutiny. 5 In other words, a
financial burden constituted a burden on speech. It stands to reason that
burdening one's ability to pay for speech would similarly constitute a
burden on speech itself, particularly because that type of burden actually
does reduce the amount of speech.8 6 Under the Court's precedents, such
a burden should suffice to trigger strict scrutiny as long as the speech
itself is protected.
82. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786 n.23 ("It is too late to suggest 'that the dependence of a
communication on the expenditure of money itself operates to introduce a nonspeech element or
to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment."' (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976))).
83. 502 U.S. 105, 109 (1991).
84. Id. at 116 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991)).
85. Id. at 117.
86. Cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam) (expenditure limits "reduce[]
the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached.").
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The Court took the same approach in United States v. National
Treasury Employees Union, finding that the First Amendment was vio-
lated by a statute that prohibited federal employees from receiving com-
pensation for speeches or articles." Writing for the Court, Justice
Stevens explained that the prohibition "unquestionably impose[d] a sig-
nificant burden on expressive activity" because it would reduce the
incentive of federal employees to speak." Tellingly, Justice Stevens did
not write that money was not speech, and that a financial burden or
disincentive did not constitute a burden on protected speech. In the cam-
paign finance context, an expenditure limit is also a burden on speech in
the sense that many forms of speech cost money.
As the preceding two cases illustrate, it is only necessary that
speech be burdened (as distinct from banned) for strict scrutiny to apply,
and financial burdens can constitute burdens on speech. If the Court has
recognized that speech is burdened where the speaker is free to speak as
much as he wants, with the caveat that he cannot receive compensation
for it, then surely speech is burdened when the speaker is limited in how
much money he can spend to disseminate his message. In other words,
whether or not money is considered speech, for purposes of First
Amendment analysis it matters only that a limitation on money is capa-
ble of burdening speech.89
Another issue implicated by restrictions on corporate speech is
whether corporations' rights to speech are commensurate with those
possessed by natural persons.90 Justice Stevens noted in his Citizens
United dissent that "the constitutional rights of certain categories of
speakers, in certain contexts, are not automatically coextensive with the
rights that are normally accorded to members of our society."9 ' The
majority, in turn, relied on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
which it read to prohibit the government from "restrict[ing] political
speech based on the speaker's corporate identity."9 2 This reading was
based on broad language in that opinion that there was "no support . . .
for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the pro-
tection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because its
source is a corporation that cannot prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a
87. 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995).
88. Id. at 468-69.
89. Cf. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 252 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting in relevant part)
("[W]here the government singles out money used to fund speech as its legislative object, it is
acting against speech as such, no less than if it had targeted the paper on which a book was printed
or the trucks that deliver it to the bookstore.").
90. See Hill, supra note 5, at 292.
91. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 946 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Morse v. Frederick,
551 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Id. at 902 (opinion of the Court).
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material effect on its business or property."93
Justice Stevens' dissent in Citizens United further complicates the
issue. He concedes that the mere fact that speech comes from a corpora-
tion does not suffice to remove it from the protection of the First
Amendment.94 On the other hand, he details the obvious differences
between legal entities and natural persons, concluding that section 203
"impose[s] only a limited burden on First Amendment freedoms . . .
because [it] leave[s] untouched the speech of natural persons."9 5 It is not
clear whether the purpose of distinguishing between corporate entities
and natural persons is to suggest some lower level of protection for cor-
porations, or to remove them from the ambit of the First Amendment
altogether (which Justice Stevens professes not to do). However,
whatever the free speech rights of corporations may be, the correspond-
ing First Amendment right to listen9 6 must still be considered. The
Court's commercial speech cases are instructive in that regard.
The Court has recognized that even speech that does "no more than
propose a commercial transaction" is at least somewhat protected by the
First Amendment.9 7 Protection of commercial speech stems from both
the particular consumer's and society's interest "in the free flow of com-
mercial information."98 Although restrictions on commercial speech are
subjected only to intermediate scrutiny, 99 Justice Stevens himself has
proposed that "when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truth-
ful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the
preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to
93. Id. (quoting First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)). The Court in
Bellotti addressed a corporate expenditure limitation that related specifically to referenda issues
rather than to the support of candidates. 435 U.S. at 767. The Court in Bellotti did note that its
"consideration of a corporation's right to speak on issues of general public interest implies no
comparable right in the quite different context of participation in a political campaign for election
to public office." Id. at 788 n.26. However, the Court in Citizens United believed that Bellotti's
"central principle"-a prohibition of identity-based restrictions-would have led to the same
result had the limitation restricted a corporation's ability to spend in support of candidates.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903.
94. Id. at 960 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 973 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("It is now well established that
the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."). Cf Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
775-76 (noting that the First Amendment "serves significant societal interests" and framing the
question at hand not as "whether corporations 'have' First Amendment rights and, if so, whether
they are coextensive with those of natural persons," but rather as whether protected expression
was abridged).
97. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
385 (1973)).
98. Id. at 763-64.




depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally
demands."'" This language seems to call for strict scrutiny to be applied
to purely commercial speech, much of which comes from corpora-
tions.' If nothing else, even Justice Stevens has not taken the stance
that the speech of corporations is not within the protection of the First
Amendment. Indeed, it would be a bizarre result to conclude that corpo-
rate speech is protected by the First Amendment when it merely pro-
poses a commercial transaction, but not when it contributes to the
political debate.o 2
The purpose of the foregoing discussion is merely to show that
political speech should be protected by the First Amendment even when
funded by corporations. Concerns about the effects of corporate spend-
ing on the electoral process are properly addressed at the strict scrutiny
stage, after recognizing that the First Amendment applies.o0 As a com-
pelling state interest is required in order for a statute to survive strict
scrutiny, it is now appropriate to address the Court's recent treatment of
the various asserted state interests, beginning with the anti-distortion
interest announced in Austin and rejected in Citizens United.
V. NARROWING THE SCOPE OF ALLOWABLE STATE INTERESTS
A. The Anti-Distortion Interest
At its essence, Citizens United is about the Court's rejection of the
idea that the government has a compelling interest in preventing the
"distorting effects" that corporate wealth might have on the political dis-
course. Although it might be argued that such an interest is not really
100. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (principal opinion).
101. While one might point out that Justice Stevens qualified his statement with the word
"non-misleading," thus implying that in a campaign finance context he might not subscribe to
strict scrutiny when "misleading" comments are made, the point of reproducing the statement here
is to show that Justices on both sides of the issue in Citizens United have expressed a willingness
to subject restrictions of corporate speech to strict scrutiny.
102. Cf Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the view of the First Amendment as a tool for informing public decision-making relates to
political and social issues "rather than the decision of a particular individual as to whether to
purchase one or another kind of shampoo").
103. Content-based regulations of protected speech are allowed under the First Amendment
only if they survive strict scrutiny, i.e., only if they are "necessary to serve a compelling state
interest" and "narrowly drawn to achieve that end." See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
"[T]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to a restriction on
a particular viewpoint, but also to a prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic." Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992). A regulation of political discussion is therefore a regulation
based on content, and is subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the regulation be narrowly
drawn to achieve a compelling state interest.
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different from an interest in preventing corruption,'" the Justices in the
new majority have long considered it to be a wholly different (and ille-
gitimate) interest.'05 In particular, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
had consistently called for Austin to be overruled because of its recogni-
tion of the anti-distortion interest. 0 6 The rejection of this interest in Citi-
zens United was based on several considerations, one of which is the
idea that government regulation of political discourse itself distorts such
discourse.
Justice Kennedy had hinted at this idea in several of his earlier
dissents. In Austin, he characterized the anti-distortion interest as "the
impermissible one of altering political debate by muting the impact of
certain speakers." 0 Under this view, once the government inhibits the
free flow of information based on the financial resources of the speaker,
it has distorted the political debate. A decade later, Justice Kennedy took
aim at the Court's decision in Buckley- v. Valeo, which had established a
two-tiered framework under which contribution limits were subjected to
lower scrutiny than were expenditure limits. 0 8 Dissenting in Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC, Justice Kennedy argued that Buckley
had led to a proliferation of "covert speech" and had "forced a substan-
tial amount of political speech underground," as would-be contributors
became more sophisticated in avoiding contribution limits." Justice
Kennedy concluded that "this new evil is itself a distortion of
speech.""o
Writing for the Court in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy implic-
itly resurrected these dissents, arguing that a ban on corporate expendi-
tures "prevent[s] corporations, including small and nonprofit
corporations, from presenting both facts and opinions to the public,"
thereby "mak[ing] Austin's antidistortion rationale all the more an aber-
104. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 970 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"Austin's antidistortion rationale is itself an anticorruption rationale.").
105. This view is likely borne of their narrow view of what the government may properly
regulate even under the anticorruption interest. See Part V-B, infra.
106. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257-58 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting in
relevant part) (arguing that Austin should be overruled because, particularly when disclosure
requirements are in place, the assertion that "amassed wealth" distorts elections undermines the
First Amendment premise that "the American people are neither sheep nor fools"); see also id. at
274 (Thomas, J., dissenting in relevant part) (arguing that Austin should be overruled because its
definition of corruption is "incompatible with the First Amendment").
107. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 703-04 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
108. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1976) (per curiam).
109. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 406-07 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Note that the purpose of BCRA, which was enacted after this case was decided, was to put a stop
to the use of soft money as a means of circumventing contribution limits.
I10. Id. at 408.
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ration.""' This also ties into the Court's rejection of the PAC as a con-
stitutionally sufficient alternative. Long before Citizens United, Justice
Kennedy argued in his Austin dissent that requiring a corporation to util-
ize a PAC was a "diffusion of the corporate message," and that the pub-
lic interest was in knowing what a corporation (rather than its PAC) had
to say." 2 In sum, Justice Kennedy's position, now adopted by a majority
of the Court, is that governmental interference with a corporation's abil-
ity to disseminate its own message constitutes a distortion of the public
discourse in violation of the First Amendment.' '3 Accordingly, Austin
(and its recognition of a compelling government interest in eliminating
the "distorting effects" of too much money in politics) had to be
overruled.
The rejection in Citizens United of Austin's anti-distortion rationale
was also based on the implications of such a rationale as it might pertain
to regulation of the media. BCRA carved out an exemption for media
corporations." 4 However, while Justice Stevens argued in dissent that it
was improper to consider the issue of media corporations absent a facial
challenge,"' the Court's purpose in discussing the media was geared
less toward a consideration of the statute itself as it was toward the pro-
priety of recognizing an anti-distortion interest.
Reiterating Justice Thomas's previous warning of a "chilling
endpoint" of "outright regulation of the press,"" 6 the Court in Citizens
United pointed out that an anti-distortion interest would permit regula-
tion of media corporations.1 17 Indeed, nothing in Austin's articulation of
the anti-distortion interest-prevention of "the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political ideas"" 8-suggests that
such an interest could not be applied to media corporations, regardless of
whether it actually is so extended. Thus, the Court noted that "media
corporations accumulate wealth with the help of the corporate form, the
largest media corporations have 'immense aggregations of wealth,' and
Il l. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 907 (2010).
112. Austin, 494 U.S. at 708-09 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
113. Cf Wright, supra note 81, at 1006 ("Nothing distorts the truth-seeking process so much as
prior restraint or government censorship.") (emphasis added).
114. See 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3)(B)(i) (2006) ("electioneering communication" definition excludes
any "communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the
facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political
party, political committee, or candidate").
115. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 976 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 283 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting in relevant part).
117. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906.
118. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
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the views expressed by media corporations often 'have little or no corre-
lation to the public's support' for those views."" 9 Justices Scalia and
Thomas had both advanced such an argument long before Citizens
United.
In his Austin dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's reli-
ance (in holding that a media exemption did not render a corporate
expenditure limitation unconstitutional) on the media's "unique role" in
informing the public was completely backward.' 20 To the contrary, the
argument went, the "unique role" of the press would actually be more of
a reason to regulate the press if an anti-distortion interest were recog-
nized as compelling, the reason being that media corporations have even
greater power and opportunity to "distort" the public discourse.' 21 Jus-
tice Scalia further noted that the Court had "consistently rejected the
proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege
beyond that of other speakers."' 2 2 Similarly, Justice Thomas argued in
his McConnell dissent that "there is no distinction between a media cor-
poration and a nonmedia corporation" when it comes to the anti-distor-
tion rationale because "[m]edia corporations are influential."' 2 3
Writing for the Court in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy noted
that the media exemption also "applies to media corporations owned or
controlled by corporations that . . . participate in endeavors other than
news."' 2 4 This "would allow a conglomerate that owns both a media
business and an unrelated business to influence or control the media in
order to advance its overall business interest."l 25 To illustrate, NBC (a
longstanding and influential member of the media) is owned by General
Electric, one of the largest corporations in the world.1 26 Given the media
exemption, General Electric would be allowed to "advance its overall
business interest. . . . [while] some other corporation, with an identical
business interest but no media outlet in its ownership structure, would be
forbidden to speak or inform the public about the same issue."127
Whether Citizens United involved a facial or as-applied challenge to sec-
tion 203 of BCRA, this sort of disparate treatment served to undermine
119. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).
120. Austin, 494 U.S. at 690-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (citing First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 (1978)).
123. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 283-84 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting in relevant part).
124. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906.
125. Id.
126. PEW PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA: AN
ANNUAL REPORT ON AMERICAN JOURNALISM (2009), http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2009/
narrative networktvownership.phpcat=5&media=6.
127. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906.
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the legitimacy of an anti-distortion interest altogether in the eyes of the
Court.
Finally, there may be another reason why the Court in Citizens
United felt compelled to overrule Austin. Several prominent politicians
have recently expressed a desire to reinstate the Fairness Doctrine, 128 a
fact that likely was not lost on the Court (even though it made no men-
tion of the Fairness Doctrine in Citizens United). The policy, adopted by
the Federal Communications Commission and repealed in 1987,129
"imposed on radio and television broadcasters the requirement that dis-
cussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and that each
side of those issues must be given fair coverage."130 Perhaps surpris-
ingly, Justice Thomas is the only one to have even hinted at the connec-
tion between the anti-distortion interest and the Fairness Doctrine.
In his McConnell dissent, Justice Thomas predicted that the Court's
rationale for upholding section 203 (a rationale based in large part on the
anti-distortion interest) would allow Congress to enact the Fairness Doc-
trine.'3 1 Justice Thomas's one-sentence warning represents the only time
in the Court's campaign finance decisions that a Justice made the con-
nection between that regulatory policy and the anti-distortion ratio-
nale,13 2 but the connection is an important one. Under the Austin regime,
the compelling government interest of preventing distortion of the politi-
cal discourse could (at least theoretically) be applied quite easily to the
regulation of political broadcasts. In rejecting the anti-distortion interest
entirely, the Court's decision in Citizens United suggests that it would
be exceedingly unlikely for the Fairness Doctrine to survive a First
Amendment challenge going forward.
B. Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption
The interest in preventing corruption, or the appearance thereof, is
the most longstanding 33 and widely accepted government interest in
128. See, e.g., Michael W. Chapman, Democratic Senator Schumer Defends Fairness Doctrine
to Regulate Talk-Radio Speech, CNSNEWS.COM, Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/
article/38785 (relating statements made by Senators Charles Schumer and John Kerry, as well as
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, in support of the Fairness Doctrine).
129. Robert Zelnick, Politics and the Fairness Doctrine, THE BosToN GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2009,
available at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial-opinionoped/articles/2009/03/07/
politicsandthefairnessdoctrine/.
130. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969).
131. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 285 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting in relevant part).
132. The connection was based on both the anti-distortion interest and the interest in
preventing the appearance of corruption.
133. See United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957) (noting the perception
common during the late 19th century that "aggregated capital unduly influenced politics, an
influence not stopping short of corruption").
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campaign finance regulation. Yet even where such an interest is recog-
nized, there is considerable debate over its application. There is, of
course, no uniform definition of "corruption," and the "appearance" of
corruption may often be in the eye of the beholder.' 34 Moreover, even
when such an interest is invoked, a regulation that is subjected to strict
(or even intermediate) scrutiny must meet a tailoring test. Given these
two factors, the new majority has employed two lines of -attack: one
based on the proper scope of the "anticorruption" interest, and another
based on the application of strict scrutiny.
It seems clear that the presence of actual, quid pro quo arrange-
ments between officeholders (or candidates) and contributors would
qualify as corruption under any accepted definition.' The Court in
Buckley recognized that "[t]o the extent that large contributions are
given to secure political quid pro quo's from current and potential office
holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is
undermined."' 36 As the regulated activity moves away from contribu-
tions and towards expenditures, however, and as it thereby represents
less clear a danger of quid pro quo, the Justices who comprise the new
majority take a far less deferential stance when the anticorruption inter-
est is invoked.
For example, in his McConnell dissent, Justice Kennedy character-
ized Buckley as based on "the principle that campaign finance regulation
that restricts speech without requiring proof of particular corrupt action
withstands constitutional challenge only if it regulates conduct posing a
demonstrable quid pro quo danger."' Accordingly, he viewed the
"rule" of Buckley to require the Court to invalidate regulations not
targeted to "actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements."1 38 Moreo-
ver, it is not enough under Justice Kennedy's standard to simply assert
that an "appearance of corruption" exists. Rather, Congress must "estab-
lish[ ] that the regulated conduct has inherent corruption potential, thus
justifying the inference that regulating the conduct will stem the appear-
134. Cf FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 495 (2007) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (an
effort to distinguish between express and issue advocacy based on an "effect on the listener" test
would be too vague because it would "pu[t] the speaker ... wholly at the mercy of the varied
understanding of his hearers" (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976) (per curiam))).
135. The more difficult question lies in the fact that the concept of an "actual, quid pro quo
arrangement" has not been defined. While an outright promise of a specific favor by a candidate
or officeholder to a donor would certainly be characterized as quid pro quo, it is unclear how
specific the promise or favor would have to be, particularly in light of the Court's admonition that
access alone does not constitute corruption. See infra note 143.
136. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
137. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 292 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting in relevant part).
138. Id. at 294 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45).
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ance of real corruption."' 3 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy articulated his
desired inquiry as whether the conduct "inherently poses a real or sub-
stantive quid pro quo danger."l 40 Chief Justice Roberts picked up on this
theme in his WRTL II opinion, stating that "[i]ssue ads like WRTL's are
by no means equivalent to contributions, and the quid-pro-quo corrup-
tion interest cannot justify regulating them.""4 ' The Court in Citizens
United solidified this narrow characterization of the anticorruption
interest.
Under this new approach, there is no such thing as an amorphous
interest in preventing an "appearance of corruption." An asserted gov-
ernment interest would have to be well-defined in order to be recog-
nized.14 2 Thus, the Court in Citizens United noted that "[i]ngratiation
and access," by themselves, "are not corruption." 4 3 The Court elabo-
rated on that point, stating that "[t]he fact that speakers may have influ-
ence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials
are corrupt." 1" Justice Kennedy cited his own McConnell dissent for
support, explaining that "[iut is in the nature of an elected representative
to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters
and contributors who support those policies." 45 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that "independent expenditures, including those made by corpo-
rations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption."' 46 In adopting the narrow view that the anticorruption inter-
est is limited to the prevention of quid pro quo corruption, the Court
implicitly adopted Justice Kennedy's perspective that "[t]he generic
favoritism or influence theory ... is at odds with standard First Amend-
ment analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting
principle."' 47
139. Id. at 297-98.
140. Id. at 298.
141. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 478-79 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
142. Chief Justice Rehnquist made this point in his McConnell dissent as well, in the context of
contribution limits. He rejected the argument that a "close relationship between federal
officeholders and the national parties" would necessarily make all donations to such parties
suspect. Noting that "a close association with others . . . is not a surrogate for corruption," he
would have held that a relationship between officeholder and organization is "irrelevant" when a
donation to an organization has "no potential to corrupt." McConnell, 540 U.S. at 351-52 (2003)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in relevant part).
143. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010); cf. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 296
(Kennedy, J., dissenting in relevant part) ("By equating vague and generic claims of favoritism or
influence with actual or apparent corruption, the Court adopts a definition of corruption that
dismantles basic First Amendment rules [and] permits Congress to suppress speech in the absence
of a quid pro quo threat .... .").
144. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
145. Id. (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in relevant part)).
146. Id. at 909.
147. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in relevant part).
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This concern with limiting principles also informs the new major-
ity's application of strict scrutiny. In particular, regulations that have
been asserted to be anti-circumvention measures have been treated as
antithetical to strict scrutiny. Although the Court in Citizens United did
not explicitly address the anti-circumvention rationale underpinning
many campaign finance regulations, its opinion (particularly its willing-
ness to limit a valid anticorruption interest to quid pro quo corruption)
was undoubtedly influenced by its previous treatment of anti-circumven-
tion measures in WRTL II. That treatment was itself informed by previ-
ous dissents.
For example, in his McConnell dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist
began with the premise that all unregulated political speech may be said
to circumvent a regulatory scheme to some degree. 14 8 Under this view,
"a rationale dependent on circumvention alone" would not suffice to jus-
tify regulations limiting the funding of speech.149 Instead, "any circum-
vention rationale ultimately must rest on the circumvention itself leading
to the corruption of federal candidates and officeholders."' Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist accused the Court in McConnell of "untethering its
inquiry from corruption or the appearance of corruption," thereby
"remov[ing] the touchstone" of campaign finance jurisprudence without
"replac[ing] it with any logical limiting principle.""' WRTL II could be
seen as an effort to replace that touchstone.
In WRTL II, Chief Justice Roberts addressed an argument by the
FEC that "an expansive definition of [the] 'functional equivalent' [of
express advocacy] is needed to ensure that issue advocacy does not cir-
cumvent the rule against express advocacy, which in turn helps protect
against circumvention of the rule against contributions."' 52 He
denounced "such a prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach to regulating
expression" as inconsistent with strict scrutiny.' 5 Recalling the Rehn-
quist rule that the circumvention interest is only legitimate if the circum-
vention itself leads to corruption, the Roberts formulation would seem to
adopt as a limiting principle the idea that regulation of only the first
level of circumvention is allowable. In other words, the consideration of
whether there is a compelling government interest stops after the first
level of the anti-circumvention analysis.
148. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 356 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in relevant part).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 355.
151. Id. at 356.
152. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 479 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
153. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976) (per curiuam) (expenditure limitations




Applying this framework to the FEC's argument in WRTL II, an
expansive definition of the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy
was requested as an anti-circumvention measure to ensure that issue
advocacy did not circumvent the rule against express advocacy. This
represents the first level of the anti-circumvention rationale. Under the
Rehnquist-Roberts approach, the Court would then ask whether this first
level of circumvention leads to corruption-i.e., whether express advo-
cacy itself leads to corruption. But when the rule against express advo-
cacy is itself seen as an anti-circumvention measure, 154 a second level of
anti-circumvention rationale is introduced, and no compelling state
interest is recognized under the Rehnquist-Roberts test.
Justice Thomas has also warned of the dangers of an unchecked
anti-circumvention rationale, expressing concern in his McConnell dis-
sent about "expanding the anti-circumvention rationale beyond rea-
son.""' He characterized Buckley's approval of a contribution limit as
being based on a concern that bribery laws "could not effectively be
enforced to prevent quid pro quos between donors and officeholders." 6
Justice Thomas then characterized Buckley's approval of a second con-
tribution limitation as being justified on the improper basis of preventing
circumvention of the first limitation.'15 Turning to the part of McConnell
which upheld section 323(f) of BCRA, Justice Thomas argued that the
Court was upholding "a third-order anticircumvention measure based on
Congress' anticipation of circumvention of these second-order anticir-
cumvention measures that might possibly, at some point in the future,
pose some problem."'15 Justice Thomas articulated the concern with rec-
ognizing a compelling government interest in anti-circumvention, argu-
ing that there will always be behavior that can be characterized as
circumventing a law's prohibition.159 He foretold a regulatory regime in
which "speech regulation will again expand to cover new forms of 'cir-
cumvention,' only to spur supposed circumvention of the new regula-
tions, and so forth."l 60 Such a "never-ending and self-justifying
process" 16 1 was emphatically rejected by Chief Justice Roberts' control-
ling opinion in WRTL II, thereby setting the stage for the Court in Citi-
zens United to conclude that the anticorruption interest cannot justify
154. Id.
155. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 266 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting in relevant part).
156. Id. at 267. Justice Thomas does not share the concern that bribery laws would be
ineffective in preventing quid pro quo corruption. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 428 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
157. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 267.
158. Id. at 268.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 268-69.
161. Id. at 269.
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limitations on independent corporate expenditures-the circumvention
of which, according to the majority, would not lead directly to quid pro
quo corruption. 162
C. Shareholder Protection
Citizens United also marked an unequivocal rejection of the
asserted government interest in "protecting dissenting shareholders from
being compelled to fund corporate political speech." 63 The rejection of
such an interest was a foreseeable corollary of the Court's treatment of
both the anti-distortion interest and the anticorruption interest. The Court
likened the shareholder-protection interest to the anti-distortion interest
in that it would allow for government regulation of media corpora-
tions. 1 64 Such regulation would be prohibited under the First Amend-
ment, reasoned the Court, regardless of whether "a shareholder of a
corporation that owns a newspaper disagrees with the political views the
newspaper expresses."1 65 Justices Scalia and Thomas had previously
rejected the shareholder-protection interest in their Austin and McCon-
nell dissents, respectively.
Justice Scalia has previously argued that a shareholder of a business
corporation invests with the understanding that he "exposes himself . . .
[to] many things that he may find politically or ideologically uncon-
genial."166 Such corporate actions might include "operation of an abor-
tion clinic, publication of a pornographic magazine, or even publication
of a newspaper that adopts absurd political views and makes cata-
strophic political endorsements."' 6 Under this view, an offended inves-
tor's recourse would be to "persuade a majority . . . of his fellow
shareholders that the action should not be taken," or to sell the stock. 168
Justice Thomas took up this line of argument in his McConnell dis-
sent, relying on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti for the proposi-
tion that there is no compelling interest in protecting shareholders in this
manner.6' The Court in Bellotti had questioned "why the dissenting
shareholder's wishes [should be] entitled to such greater solicitude in
this context than in many others where equally important and controver-
sial corporate decisions are made by management or by a predetermined
162. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010).
163. Id. at 911.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 687 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
166. Austin, 494 U.S. at 686-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 687.
168. Id.
169. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 275 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting in relevant part).
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percentage of the shareholders."o7 0 Similarly, in rejecting the share-
holder-protection interest, the Court in Citizens United suggested that
any problems relating to disaffected shareholders should be "corrected
by shareholders 'through the procedures of corporate democracy.' "171
The new majority's insistence upon limiting principles also factors
into its stance on shareholder protection. As the Court's aforementioned
rhetorical question in Bellotti suggests, a compelling interest in share-
holder protection might theoretically be extended to entirely unreasona-
ble lengths. Could the government intervene to protect a corporate
shareholder's sensibilities in the event that the corporation decided to
enter the pornography business? If not, then there must be something
unique about the attack on an investor's sensibilities that might occur
when the corporation makes a decision to take a certain political stance,
or to back a certain politician. What is less clear is why that should be
constitutionally significant. While the investor might feel that the corpo-
ration is compelling him to speak in support of the candidate it supports,
any compulsion would be attributable to the corporation rather than to
the government. 172 As no government actor would be involved, there
would be no colorable First Amendment claim based on compelled
speech.' 7 3 Thus, the issue simply comes down to a policy decision of
whether protecting shareholders from collectively funding political
speech with which they disagree is compelling to the point where the
government can prevent the corporation from using its general treasury
to fund such speech. The Court in Citizens United has answered that
question with a resounding "no."
D. The Level Playing Field
Finally, if there is a single, overarching theme to the new campaign
finance jurisprudence, it is that the government does not have a compel-
ling interest in altering the political discourse in order to "level the play-
ing field" so that all speakers have an equal voice. Citizens United
implicitly adopts as its guiding principle what Justice Scalia once wrote
was "the absolutely central truth of the First Amendment: that govern-
ment cannot be trusted to assure, through censorship, the 'fairness' of
170. First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978).
171. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794).
172. Although Justice Stevens describes this scenario as an "injury to the shareholders'
expressive rights," id. at 978, it is unclear what "rights" are being referenced. It would be a
dubious proposition to suggest that First Amendment rights are implicated.
173. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("[T]he right of freedom of
thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.").
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political debate." 7 4 In his Austin dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that
"the notion that the government has a legitimate interest in restricting
the quantity of speech to equalize the relative influence of speakers on
elections is antithetical to the First Amendment."77 The Court adopted
this position in Davis v. FEC (the most recent campaign finance case
before Citizens United), stating that "[1]eveling electoral opportunities
means making and implementing judgments about which strengths
should be permitted to contribute to the outcome of an election." 76 This
was said to interfere with the ability of the voters to decide for them-
selves whom to elect.17 7
Citizens United solidifies the new majority's rejection of the "level
playing field" interest. The Court explained that "[b]y taking the right to
speak from some and giving it to others, the Government deprives the
disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive to
establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's voice." 7 8 The
Court also tied together the anti-distortion rationale and the equality
rationale, warning that under the former, "wealthy media corporations
could have their voices diminished to put them on par with other media
entities.""' These considerations led to the Court's conclusion that the
government "may not suppress political speech on the basis of the
speaker's corporate identity."'s 0 To the Justices who formed the major-
ity in Citizens United, governmental efforts to level the playing field
interfere with the "marketplace of ideas" protected by the First Amend-
ment.' 8 ' Just as one would expect to find disparities in the resources of
participants in an economic marketplace, similar disparities can be found
in the marketplace of ideas-the gap between the financial resources of
corporations and those of the average individual being the most obvious
example. Yet under the conception of the First Amendment that now
controls, this is preferable to a regime in which the government decides
when someone (or some corporation) has spoken too much.182
174. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
175. Id. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976)
(per curiam)).
176. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2774 (2008).
177. Id. at 2773-74.
178. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).
179. Id. at 905.
180. Id. at 913.
181. Id. at 906 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 274 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting in
relevant part)).
182. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 695 (1990) (Scalia, J.,




Citizens United leaves an indelible impression on the campaign
finance landscape. Although the full ramifications of the decision will
likely not be known until some time passes, the Court at least somewhat
clarified the permissible scope of regulation. The messy distinction
between express advocacy and issue advocacy no longer matters in the
context of independent expenditures made by corporations, as the Court
characterized its decision to overrule Austin as also invalidating the pro-
hibition of the use of corporate treasury funds for express advocacy.' 83
Perhaps more importantly, the distinction between individuals and cor-
porations has been eliminated for purposes of independent expenditures,
in accordance with the Court's political speech framework. As a corol-
lary, a corporation cannot be required to filter its speech through a politi-
cal action committee. Reliance on the anticorruption interest will be
accepted only to the extent that the corruption is defined as quid pro quo.
The interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption would now seem to
be the only compelling government interest sufficient to uphold restric-
tions on corporate independent expenditures. On a broader scale, any
government regulation of speech will have to be premised on a govern-
ment interest other than ensuring that public discourse is "undistorted"
or "fair." At the same time, the Court's decision to uphold BCRA's dis-
closure provisions was in keeping with its conception of a system in
which citizens have full access to information and then use that informa-
tion to make decisions for themselves. 184
Given this conception, the Court does not see corporate expendi-
tures as interfering (at least not directly) with the right to vote. Even
Justice Scalia has taken the position that "[o]ther rights, even the most
basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined."' 8 5 Similarly, Jus-
tice Kennedy, in upholding a statute that prohibited the solicitation of
votes and the display of campaign materials within 100 feet of the
entrance to a polling place, wrote that "there is a narrow area in which
the First Amendment permits freedom of expression to yield to the
extent necessary for the accommodation of another constitutional
right"-the right to vote.18 6 However, under the conception of the First
Amendment that is articulated in Citizens United, the Court may see the
183. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
184. Id. at 914-15.
185. McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 379 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964)).
186. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 213 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)).
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right to vote as being protected simply by the fact that voters will have
access to as much information as they choose to receive.
